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Multifonctionnalité de l’agriculture et libéralisation des échanges
Résumé – Les auteurs utilisent un modèle de commerce international en équilibre partiel pour analyser
les interactions entre politiques tarifaire et environnementale en présence de bénéfices liés au caractère
multifonctionnel de l’agriculture. Ils montrent que la libéralisation des échanges est sous-optimale si
elle ne s’accompagne pas d’une politique environnementale efficiente encourageant la production des
bénéfices liés à la multifonctionnalité. Toutefois, dans le cas d’un grand pays importateur net, la
réduction des droits de douanes renforce les incitations à introduire une politique environnementale.
Cette dernière incorpore une distorsion stratégique afin de compenser partiellement la baisse de droits
de douane Malgré son caractère stratégique, cette politique environnementale permet d’accroître sans
ambiguïté le bien-être global si elle est introduite conjointement avec une réduction des droits de
douane. Les auteurs concluent que, bien que l’argument de la multifonctionnalité étaye certaines
critiques de la libéralisation des échanges, il ne s’avère pas solide quand cette libéralisation induit
l’introduction d’une politique environnementale.
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Summary – This paper employs a partial equilibrium trade model to analyse the interaction of trade and
environmental policy in the context of agriculture’s multifunctionality. We formally demonstrate that free trade is
suboptimal if no efficient environmental policy addressing the provision of multifunctional benefits is in place.
However, tariff reductions in a large net-importing country reinforce the incentive for that country to introduce
environmental policy, though this policy will be strategically distorted to partly substitute for the tariff. Despite
its strategic character, this environmental policy programme will unambiguously enhance global welfare if it is
introduced in conjunction with tariff reductions. We conclude that, although the multifunctionality argument
may lend some support to the criticism of trade liberalisation, the argument is not solid when trade liberalisation
induces the introduction of environmental policy.
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HE LIBERALISATION of agricultural trade and the increasing attention paid to
agriculture’s multifunctionality have given rise to tensions in recent WTO
negotiations (Kennedy et al.,1999; Anderson, 2000; Potter and Burney, 2002).
Policy makers in parts of Europe and Asia fear that trade liberalisation and reduction
of agricultural support may adversely affect the provision of public goods which are
jointly produced with agricultural commodities (Hodge, 2000; Mahé, 2001; Latacz-
Lohmann and Hodge, 2001). While these countries stress the importance of
safeguarding the provision of public environmental goods, critics suspect that the
multifunctionality argument is used as a pretext for protective domestic policy
measures (Vasavada and Warmerdam, 1998; Freeman and Roberts, 1999; Bagwell
and Staiger, 2001; Blandford et al., 2003). The question of whether domestic support
policies pursuing multifunctional goals can be classified as non-trade distorting has
therefore become a controversial issue in the WTO process (Swinbank, 1999; Ervin,
1999; Josling, 2003).
Neoclassical trade theory suggests that world welfare is enhanced if (and only if)
efficient environmental policies are introduced while trade is liberalised (Anderson,
1992; Runge, 1999). However, agri-environmental policy is still in its infancy. It
was not until 1992 that the concept of paid stewardship was introduced into the
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge, 2003). For
decades, the CAP’s commodity regimes had provided price support to European
farmers without being accompanied by specific environmental policies addressing
agriculture’s multifunctional non-market effects. The virtual absence, until recently,
of such policies may reflect the view held by many policy makers that previous levels
of protection had resulted in an optimal supply of these benefits. The paucity of
specific policy measures may also explain the critical attitude towards trade
liberalisation among policy makers in parts of Asia and Europe: if an uncorrected
distortion exists in one sector ( e.g. non-internalised externalities), then the optimising
rules for the remaining sectors ( e.g. free trade) will generally no longer produce
optimal resource allocation (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956).
Since the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA) in 1994, which is often referred to as the initiation of trade liberalisation in
the agricultural sector, agri-environmental policy has become increasingly important
in the EU (Guyomard et al., 1993; Josling and Tangermann, 1999). Other countries
such as Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and Norway are likely to follow this route
as international pressure for reform of their domestic farm support regimes is
beginning to mount. Prior to the 2003 CAP reforms, agri-environmental payments
had a less than 5 percent share of the total CAP budget (European Commission,
2003). However, as a result of the latest CAP reforms, a significant share of the
budget currently spent on direct support measures is to be transferred, through
modulation, to the rural development section of the CAP, from which the EU’s agri-
environmental policy is financed.
This paper aims at investigating the extent to which the increasing importance of
agri-environmental policy may be attributed to tariff reduction requirements agreed
in recent WTO trade negotiations. We formally demonstrate that tariff reduction
requirements reinforce the incentive for a large country to introduce environmental
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policy. We show that the optimal environmental policy will be distorted to the
extent that it partly substitutes for the tariff reduction. We further show how this
policy change, i.e. trade liberalisation in conjunction with the introduction of a
distorted environmental policy, affects global welfare. We demonstrate that, while
global welfare effects of trade liberalisation are generally ambiguous in the absence of
environmental policy, social welfare is unanimously enhanced if trade liberalisation
in an importing country is accompanied by the introduction of environmental policy.
This result even holds if environmental policies are strategically chosen to partly
substitute for tariff reductions. Our analysis thus suggests that, although the
multifunctionality argument may lend some support to the criticism of trade
liberalisation, the argument is not solid when trade liberalisation induces the
introduction of environmental policy.
The paper is organised into six further sections. The first section presents the
model, the second one analyses the optimal tariff in the absence of environmental
policy. This is taken to represent the situation prior to the GATT Uruguay Round
when the CAP’s commodity regimes provided price support to farmers without
explicitly addressing the various positive and negative environmental externalities of
agriculture. The third section then examines how tariff concessions affect a country’s
incentive to introduce environmental policy. In the two following ones, we analyse
the welfare implications of trade liberalisation, depending on whether the country
offering tariff concessions simultaneously introduces an optimal environmental policy
or not. The last section revisits some of the critical assumptions underlying the
analysis and explores how results would change if these were relaxed. The paper
concludes with a summary of the main findings.
The model
The analysis is based on an extended version of Krutilla’s (1991) partial
equilibrium trade model, which considers a negative environmental externality
linked to production. Krutilla demonstrated that a large importing country opening
up to free trade would set its environmental output tax rate below the level of the
Pigouvian tax rate. The rationale behind this is that a lower tax rate stimulates
domestic production which improves the country’s terms of trade. A strategically
distorted environmental policy thereby acts as a substitute for an optimal tariff.
We are aware that a tax or subsidy linked to production does not represent agri-
environmental policy particularly well. An alternative approach would have been to
model environmental policy as a tax on environmentally harmful inputs in
combination with a subsidy linked to land use, based on the framework presented by
Peterson et al. (2002). While this would have provided a better characterisation of
agri-environmental policy, it would have increased the complexity of the analysis to
the point that no meaningful insights into the interactions of trade and
environmental policies could have been gained. We have therefore chosen to build
our model around Krutilla’s (1991) framework which models environmental policy
as a tax/subsidy linked to externality-generating outputs.61
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We extend Krutilla’s (1991) one-country model by including a second large
country. The two countries trade in a single homogeneous agricultural commodity.
This extension allows us to analyse both domestic and global welfare effects. The
supply in the home country (Country 1) is produced at cost , but production
also affects the environment . We assume that the environmental impact of
production () , which includes agriculture’s multifunctional benefits, is
not internalised into the market system and that externalities do not spill over across
national boundaries. The analysis is based on the assumption that agriculture’s
positive non-market effects more than outweigh the detrimental impacts at all levels
of production, that is, the net environmental effect is positive throughout. We
further assume that the utility from marginal environmental improvements is
decreasing. Hence, and . We emphasize that the
assertion of a positive net environmental impact is not necessarily true. Especially at
high levels of agricultural output, the sign of the net effect may indeed be negative.
However, we maintain the assumption of a positive net effect because this paper aims
to test whether agriculture’s multifunctionality provides a case against trade
liberalisation based on the hypothesis of an overall positive environmental effect of
farming. The last section provides a brief discussion of how results would change if
agri-environmental externalities were negative.
The agricultural good is also produced in the foreign country (Country2);
however, in the interest of simplicity, the environmental impact of production
abroad is assumed to be neutral. The government of the home country can fix a
tariff, defined as a tax on imports (T) or subsidy on exports (-T), and implement
agri-environmental policy . Abstracting from the complexity of a first-best policy
design, we model agri-environmental policy as a tax ( t ) or subsidy ( -t ) linked to
production, for the reasons set out above.
This is not to say, we emphasize, that we advocate production subsidies for the
internalisation of multifunctional non-market effects. As explained above, the
provision of environmental public goods is best addressed by a more targeted policy
which addresses the problem at its source. However, given the difficulty of
integrating such first-best policies into trade models, we revert to the compromise of
modelling agri-environmental policy as a tax or subsidy on production, with tax/
subsidy rates reflecting the marginal social cost/value of the environmental impacts.
We assume that the tax/subsidy and tariff instruments are not available to the
authorities abroad. That is, we do not allow for the possibility of direct or indirect
retaliatory action taken by the foreign country. The home country’s supply
and demand are defined as functions of domestic supply and demand prices,
respectively, whereas Country 2’s supply and demand schedules are
determined by the world price. We assume supply and demand curves to be well-
behaved and non-concave. Hence, ,,
and , . Building upon these
relationships, social welfare functions can be defined for both the home country and
the foreign country. Country 1’s welfare () is defined as the sum of consumer
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surplus and producer benefit, tax revenues, tariff revenues, and the value of the
environmental externality 1 :
(1)
Analogously, equation (2) defines social welfare for Country 2 () as the
aggregate of consumer surplus and producer benefit:
(2)
We assume that world welfare can be depicted as the sum of welfare of the home
and foreign country () . Furthermore, the model is based on the trade
equilibrium requirements of excess demand () in Country 1 being
equal to excess supply in Country 2:
(3)
In the interest of simplicity, we ignore the existence of transaction and
transportation costs. Hence, the margin between the home country’s demand
priceand the world price is determined solely by the tariff rate, while the
environmental tax/subsidy rate exclusively determines the difference between
domestic supply price and demand price. The model is completed with the
assumption of perfect competition, hence supply prices equal marginal production
costs both at home and abroad:
(4)
The optimal tariff rate prior to trade liberalisation
We begin by deriving the optimal tariff rate prior to trade liberalisation as a
benchmark for the subsequent analysis. Assume that Country1 is free to set its
environmental tax/subsidy and tariff rates simultaneously in order to maximise
domestic welfare. The first-order conditions for an interior maximum are obtained by
1 We define the ‘producer benefit’ as the difference between total revenues and total costs,
which differs from ‘producer surplus’ measuring the difference between total revenues and
variable costs.
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taking the partial derivatives of (1) with respect to the tax/subsidy and tariff rates,
setting these equal to zero and solving simultaneously () .






Simultaneously solving equations (5) and (6) yields:
and (7)
Equation (7) constitutes the first-best policy set for a country aiming to maximise
domestic welfare. The first-best environmental policy is the Pigouvian tax/subsidy
rate () , while the first-best tariff is identical to Bhagwati and
Ramaswami’s (1963) optimal tariff of international trade theory. The optimal tariff
is determined by Country 1’s trade flow () and the price responsiveness of
Country 2’s excess supply () .
These findings are contrary to actual policy observations. We argued above that
agri-environmental policy had, for a long time, been virtually non-existent in
countries stressing the importance of agriculture’s multifunctionality. Besides reasons
of government failure, efficient agri-environmental policies may not have been
implemented because of prohibitively high administrative costs or information
deficiencies, or simply because previous levels of protection were deemed appropriate
for generating a sufficient supply of multifunctional benefits. This is not the place to
speculate about the political reasons for the paucity of agri-environmental policy. We
conclude that the first-best policy set in (7) is apparently not the correct benchmark
for the subsequent analysis if governments, for whatever reason, do not make
appropriate use of the environmental policy instrument. A more appropriate
benchmark seems to be one that assumes maximisation of domestic welfare by
choosing T , while t is fixed at some arbitrary level, say t = 0. We term the resultant
level of T the second-best tariff policy, i.e. the tariff rate that maximises domestic
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welfare in the absence of environmental policy () . This tariff rate is
computed by solving equation (6) for the tariff rate 2 :
(8)
Equation (8) demonstrates that the optimal tariff in the absence of environmental
policy is unambiguously positive () for an importing country () ,
and that it deviates from the first-best tariff in (7) to the extent that it has to correct
for the missing environmental policy. Although the second-best policy in (8) is
inferior to the first-best policy set of equation (7), it will be chosen as the benchmark
for the subsequent analysis, since it may better reflect the political reality of most
countries prior to conclusion of the URAA.
Do tariff reduction requirements encourage environmental policy?
We now proceed to analyse whether tariff reduction requirements create a distinct
incentive for a country to introduce environmental policy. As stressed above, we
conduct this analysis against the benchmark of a second-best tariff as per (8) in the
absence of environmental policy. To assess the incentive for introducing environ-
mental policy, we analyse the home country’s welfare functions, depending on
whether an optimal environmental policy is implemented () or not () 3 .
We begin by analysing how domestic welfare is affected if Country1 introduces
an optimal environmental policy while the tariff remains at the second-best level as
per (8). It is generally plausible that Country 1’s welfare will increase if it adjusts its
environmental policy, hence 4 . Furthermore, we can
demonstrate that, for a net-importing country, the domestically optimal second-best
tariff rate in the absence of environmental policy is generally higher than the first-
best tariff rate, as depicted in Figure 1. This conclusion is derived as follows: by
substituting equation (8) into (5), we can analyse how domestic welfare in the
benchmark scenario is affected by a marginal change of the tax/subsidy rate:
(9)
The derivative in (9) assumes a negative value as t is marginally increased,
suggesting that the domestically optimal environmental policy in the benchmark
scenario is a subsidy (negative tax). Implementing an environmental subsidy, in turn,
2 Note, that the domestically optimal tariff deviates from the tariff calculated within
Krutilla’s (1991) partial equilibrium framework, which was not correctly specified.
3 Let denote the domestically optimal second-best tax/subsidy rate for a given tariff rate.
4 Domestic welfare with and without environmental policy will be equal to the tariff rate at
which the optimal second-best tax/subsidy rate is zero. For any other tariff rate, domestic
welfare will increase as a result of introducing a domestically optimal environmental policy.
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lowers Country 1’s optimal tariff rate. This can be shown by taking the first
derivative of equation (8) with respect to the environmental tax rate:
(10)
Equation (10) assumes a positive value for a large net-importing country, proving
that the first-best tariff is lower than the second-best tariff: () . This
relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.
Based on the constellation of the domestic welfare functions with and without
optimal environmental policy, as illustrated in Figure1, we can now demonstrate that
the incentive for a large net-importing country to introduce environmental policy
increases as the tariff is reduced. This can be seen by considering the move from
point b to point c in Figure 1. Point b represents the country’s initial welfare level -
prior to tariff reduction requirements in the absence of environmental policy, when
the country operates a second-best tariff which partly substitutes for the lack
of environmental policy. If Country 1 now were to introduce an environmental
subsidy to internalise the multifunctional non-market benefits, it would deliberately
reduce the tariff rate from to , thus achieving welfare level c in
Figure 1. The potential welfare gain associated with the initiation of the optimal
environmental policy in the benchmark scenario is thus given by distance .
We now proceed to assess the potential welfare gain from implementing an envi-
ronmental policy if an international trade agreement requires the home country to
lower its tariff rate, say, from to in Figure 1. At tariff rate ,
Country 1 can only attain welfare level d in the absence of environmental policy.
Figure 1. Domestic welfare functions for a large net-importing country ( X 1 < 0)
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However, with the domestically optimal environmental subsidy rate in place, it could
reach welfare level c ; the gain in domestic welfare thus equals. Since the welfare
gain from introducing environmental policy increases from (without tariff reduc-
tion requirement) to (with tariff reduction requirement), we conclude that tariff
concessions reinforce the incentive for a country to introduce environmental policy,
quod erat demonstrandum . Note that this incentive becomes even stronger as the tariff is
reduced below , since the gap between the two welfare functions increases.
Welfare effects of trade liberalisation in the absence
of environmental policy
Having demonstrated that trade concessions encourage environmental policy, the
question now is how this policy change affects global welfare. Before turning to this
question in the following section, we first analyse the welfare implications of trade
liberalisation in the absence of environmental policy, since this may explain the
criticism of free trade voiced in the multifunctionality debate.
In order to assess the global welfare effects of tariff reductions in the absence of
environmental policy, we derive as a benchmark the policy set that maximises world
welfare. We shall refer to the latter as the globally (as opposed to the domestically )
optimal policy set. The globally optimal first-best policy solution for an open
economy is free trade () combined with a Pigouvian tax or subsidy
() . This result can be formally established by setting the partial
derivatives of the world welfare function () equal to zero. Applying the
constraints in equations (3) and (4) to simplify the result, we obtain:
(11)
(12)
Solving equations (11) and (12) simultaneously for the tax and tariff rates yields:
and (13)
However, in the absence of environmental policy (or, more generally, if the tax/
subsidy rate is not set at the Pigouvian level), free trade is no longer the first-best
solution. By solving equation (12) for the tariff rate, we obtain the globally optimal
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It is clear from (14) that, for a net-importing country, a positive tariff is the
globally optimal trade policy in the absence of environmental policy. This is
plausible because the tariff would increase domestic production, thereby stimulating
the supply of environmental benefits associated with production 5 . From this we
conclude that full trade liberalisation is not efficient if environmental externalities
are not internalised through appropriate policies.
Next we demonstrate that, in the absence of environmental policy, the
domestically optimal second-best tariff is higher than the globally optimal tariff
() . This can be proven by evaluating the marginal global welfare
change (equation (12)) at the domestically optimal second-best tariff rate of equation
(8):
(15)
Since equation (15) assumes a negative value for a net-importing country, we infer
that lowering a domestically optimal tariff increases world welfare. The rationale
behind this is that a net-importing country’s optimal trade policy not only corrects for
the missing environmental policy, but also improves its terms of trade through the
fact that the domestically optimal tariff rate is higher than the globally optimal one.
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 2. In the absence of environmental
policy, global welfare is maximised at a positive tariff rate () , yielding
welfare level c . The figure also depicts free trade () as well as the domestically
optimal second-best tariff which was shown to be higher than the globally
optimal tariff () , with the corresponding welfare levels e (for free trade) and a
(for the second-best tariff). From this we conclude that, in the absence of efficient
environmental policy, a partial move towards free trade (move from a to c ) will
enhance global welfare, whereas the sign of the global welfare effect of full trade
liberalisation (move from a to e ) remains ambiguous.
5 Note that this conclusion is sensitive to the strong jointness assumption, whereby the
supply of multifunctional benefits is a strictly increasing function of domestic agricultural
production (represented by the domestic supply of the single agricultural commodity).
Figure 2. World welfare functions for alternative trade/environmental policy
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Welfare effects of trade liberalisation and environmental policy
We now turn to the case of Country 1 launching an environmental policy
programme in response to tariff reduction requirements. The domestically optimal
environmental policy for any given tariff rate (including free trade) is derived by
solving equation (5) for the tax/subsidy rate:
(16)
The domestically optimal tax/subsidy rate internalises the environmental
externality, represented by the first term of equation (16). It further includes a
“strategic” component, indicated by the second term of equation (16). The strategic
component can be interpreted as a substitute for the optimal tariff. It is clear from
(16) that the strategic component is zero for a small country, implying that the
Pigouvian tax/subsidy scheme is the optimal policy choice. For a large country,
however, the environmental policy deviates from the Pigouvian tax/subsidy rate to
the extent that it substitutes for the tariff.
We now demonstrate that abolition of a positive tariff in a large importing
country, combined with the launch of an optimal environmental policy (move from
a to d in Figure 2) will unambiguously enhance global welfare. This result is
obtained in two steps. We first derive the domestically optimal environmental policy
response at the globally optimal second-best tariff rate:
(17)
Since equation (17) takes a negative value for a net-importing country, the
domestically optimal environmental policy response is an environmental subsidy.
Next, we analyse how global welfare is affected by that environmental subsidy:
(18)
Since equation (18) assumes a negative value, we conclude that global welfare
increases if the home country introduces an environmental subsidy while maintai-
ning the globally optimal second-best tariff rate (. This
is illustrated in Figure 2. We can now show that, once a domestically optimal envi-
ronmental policy has been introduced, abolishing the tariff further enhances global
welfare. This result is formally established by determining the globally optimal tariff
rate for the home country’s domestically optimal environmental policy. The latter is
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Since equation (19) takes a negative value for a net-importing country, we con-
clude that, in the presence of a strategically chosen environmental policy, global wel-
fare () is maximised at a negative tariff rate. This is plausible because the tariff
would need to correct for the distorted environmental policy (Figure2). By making
use of equations (12), (16) and (19), it can be proven that the slope of the global wel-
fare function is generally negative () for any . This provi-
des the proof that global welfare increases unambiguously (by in Figure 2), if the
abolition of a positive tariff is accompanied by the introduction of a strategically dis-
torted environmental policy.
In sum, we can conclude from the analysis that in the absence of environmental
policy, full trade liberalisation does not maximise global welfare. If, however, trade
liberalisation induces a country to implement environmental policy, full trade
liberalisation is the globally optimal solution, even if the environmental policy is
chosen to partly substitute for the tariff.
Discussion
The analysis in this paper is based on a number of critical assumptions and
simplifications, most of which were necessary to facilitate the modelling of the
interaction between trade and environmental policies. The question therefore arises
whether the findings and conclusions from the analysis still hold under more general
assumptions.
The most critical simplification relates to the modelling of agri-environmental
policy as a tax/subsidy linked to agricultural output (Krutilla, 1991) as opposed to
agricultural inputs (Peterson et al., 2002). We argued that the more elaborate input-
based representation of agri-environmental policy would have made the analysis
intractable. We have used the simple specification to demonstrate, among other
things, that global welfare is unambiguously enhanced if trade concessions induce an
environmental policy programme which did not exist previously. This principle
holds regardless of whether environmental policy is modelled as an input-based or an
output-based tax/subsidy, provided that environmental amenities are (at least to
some extent) produced jointly with agricultural commodities. In both cases, an
optimal environmental policy is distorted to the extent that it stimulates domestic
production, thereby influencing the world price in the home country’s favour.
Modelling environmental policy as a tax/subsidy linked to output represents an
upper limit on the output effect caused by a domestically optimal environmental
policy. A more targeted policy would achieve environmental enhancements with less
output distortion. We have demonstrated that an output-based environmental policy
unambiguously enhances global welfare, that is, the welfare loss due to the indirect
distortions is more than outweighed by the welfare gains from trade liberalisation.
This effect will be more pronounced for a more targeted environmental policy that
addresses the use of inputs rather than outputs.
Another assumption relates to retaliation. The two-country model with a single
commodity does not allow for retaliation by the foreign country, especially since the
Wt () *
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tax/subsidy and tariff instruments are assumed unavailable to the government of the
foreign country. Based on this simple model, the exploitation of terms-of-trade
effects via domestic environmental policy was shown to be unambiguously welfare-
enhancing for the home country. This conclusion may change if the possibility of
retaliatory action were included in the model: The welfare-enhancing effect would be
much reduced, if not eliminated, in a multi-commodity world where countries are
exporters of some goods and importers of others. Exploring the impact of retaliation,
however, would have required a game theoretic approach to modelling trade-
environment interactions. We leave this topic for future work.
The analysis is predicated on the assumption that agriculture’s positive non-
market effects more than outweigh the detrimental impacts at all levels of
production. This assumption, though controversial, was driven by the objective to
test whether agriculture’s multifunctionality provides a case against trade
liberalisation based on the hypothesis of an overall positive environmental effect of
farming. The model is general enough to enable analysis of a net negative effect of the
form . For a large net-importing country, with a negative overall
environmental impact of agriculture:
–the first-best environmental tax rate is the Pigouvian tax (as per
equation (7));
–the domestically optimal tax rate is lower than the Pigouvian tax rate so as to
stimulate domestic production, thereby influencing the world price in the home
country’s favour (as per equation (16));
–i n the absence of an environmental tax programme, full trade liberalisation
does not result in maximum world welfare, and a negative tariff which discourages
domestic production and thus negative externalities is the optimal policy choice (see
equation (14));
–g lobal welfare is unambiguously enhanced if tariff reductions induce the
domestically optimal (distorted) environmental tax programme.
Another simplifying assumption relates to the environmental impact of
agricultural production in the foreign country. This was assumed to be neutral. Some
of the key conclusions from the analysis are likely to change if we had allowed for
non-neutral environmental impacts abroad. It is far from clear then whether trade
liberalisation in conjunction with the introduction of a distorted environmental
policy programme would enhance global welfare. We can only speculate about the
sign of the global welfare effect because we are considering the movement from one
second-best situation ( i.e. tariff without environmental policy) to another (free trade
with distorted environmental policy and non-internalised externalities abroad).
However, all conclusions would remain unchanged if one assumed that the
environmental externalities in the foreign country were efficiently internalised
through appropriate environmental policy.
Another aspect worth exploring is linkages to other sectors and commodities. The
simple one-commodity setup of the model was appropriate to understand the
principles underlying the interaction between trade and environmental policies,
which was the key objective of the paper. Exploring the linkages between agriculture
and other sectors, or among multiple agricultural commodities, would have required
∂∂ < ES S 11 1 0 ()
t 1
**71
AGRICULTURAL MULTIFUNCTIONALITY AND TRADE LIBERALISATION
the application of a computable general equilibrium model. For the latter, the reader
is referred to the relevant literature ( e.g. Cretegny, 2002). Comparisons between
partial and general equilibrium models of agricultural trade liberalisation have
demonstrated that welfare changes will differ in scale. However, they are unlikely to
differ in sign (Bautista et al., 2001 ; Gohin and Moschini, 2006).
Conclusion
In this paper we extended Krutilla’s (1991) trade model to investigate whether
multifunctionality provides a sound rationale for maintaining trade barriers. We
conducted our analysis against the benchmark of agricultural policies that prevailed
before the conclusion of the URAA, when many net-importing countries had in
place tariff policies which partly substituted for specific environmental policies
addressing agriculture’s multifunctionality. We first demonstrated that tariff
reduction requirements provide an extra incentive for a large net-importing country
to introduce an environmental policy programme. We then analysed the global
welfare effects of trade liberalisation, with and without simultaneous introduction of
environmental policy.
If no environmental policy is implemented, full trade liberalisation does not
result in maximum world welfare. The globally optimal trade policy for a net-
importing country remains a positive tariff, which partly substitutes for the missing
environmental policy. If, however, trade concessions are accompanied by the
implementation of an environmental policy programme, the domestically optimal
environmental policy deviates from the Pigouvian solution. If a country is
sufficiently large to manipulate its terms of trade, the environmental policy
programme partly substitutes for an optimal tariff policy. Notwithstanding this
deviation, global welfare will be unambiguously enhanced as long as trade
liberalisation induces an environmental policy programme which did not previously
exist. This principle holds regardless of whether environmental policy targets the use
of inputs (Peterson et al., 2002) or the use of outputs (Krutilla, 1991), provided that
environmental amenities are (at least to some extent) produced jointly with
agricultural commodities.
Returning to the key motivating question of this paper, we conclude that
multifunctionality cannot provide a sound rationale for maintaining trade barriers,
except when there is little prospect for the introduction of environmental policy in
response to trade liberalisation. Only in such circumstances may the multifunctional
role of agriculture provide a case against full trade liberalisation. A positive tariff
would then serve to mimic the role of environmental policy. The recent CAP
reforms, however, have provided ample evidence that the move towards more liberal
agricultural trade does have an influence on the design of domestic policies, and that
agri-environmental policies in particular could be responsive to changes in the level
of protection. The increasing importance of agri-environmental contracting, the
linking of environmental cross-compliance conditions to the EU’s single payment
scheme, and the introduction of ‘modulation’ have demonstrated that tariff reduction
requirements may constitute a supplementary argument which reinforces theT. GLEBE, U. LATACZ-LOHMANN
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incentive for the introduction of agri-environmental policies. The analysis in this
paper suggests that, as long as domestic policy is responsive to reduced levels of
protection, full trade liberalisation is the globally optimal solution, even if domestic
environmental policies are designed to partly substitute for border protection. We
thus conclude that, in the current EU policy environment, the multifunctional role
of agriculture does not provide a valid rationale for obstructing the way towards freer
trade in agricultural commodities.
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